The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic
Science (Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony)
Michael J. Saks∗
I want to address two issues. First, I will state what I believe is the
1
most essential test, the heart and soul of Daubert and its progeny. In
light of that essential test, I then discuss how all courts that have
considered challenges to fingerprint expert testimony have
concluded that the expert testimony is admissible by failing to
perform that essential test.
I. THE ELEMENTAL STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
EVIDENCE ON EMPIRICAL MATTERS
First, I would argue that factfinders ought to be provided with
information that will help them resolve factual uncertainties relevant
to the dispute they have been asked to decide—moving them closer
to a correct conclusion about a disputed fact. With that touchstone in
mind, I argue that it would make sense to admit any expert evidence
that meets the following conditions, and to admit expert evidence
only if it meets these conditions: (a) the opinions and conclusions of
the expert are accompanied by information that enables the
factfinder to evaluate the likely accuracy of the expert’s opinion, and
(b) the information is presented in such a way that factfinders will
2
not be fooled into excessively overvaluing the testimony. Moreover,
3
it seems to me that much of what Daubert and Kumho Tire are
designed to achieve is reflected by that first criterion: the
requirement that claims of expertise be subjected to testing—using
sound research methods (the essential purpose of peer review and
∗
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmls., Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
What I mean to say here is that we can expect of courts only a rough precision.
Some over-valuing or under-valuing of the expert evidence is unavoidable. Courts
should be concerned with preventing jurors (or themselves) from being led
immoderately off target by the expert opinion.
3
Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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publication), yielding meaningful data on error rates. The second
criterion can be found in the helpfulness test of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and certainly in Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
4
Thus, along with Richard Friedman, I would not exclude expert
evidence merely because the witnesses practicing in that field assert
erroneous conclusions with some regularity. I would, however,
condition such admission on the factfinder being informed about the
likelihood of error in the opinions, and the court being satisfied that
the factfinder is capable of properly adjusting the weight to be given
5
to the evidence. Taking Friedman’s example of hair identification,
suppose we could only speculate about the diagnostic value of
microscopic hair evidence (which was the situation for a long time),
or suppose such witnesses routinely exaggerated the accuracy of
their evidence (which did and still does occur). This testimony still
should not be admitted. Not by my test or by the Supreme Court’s
test, and probably not under Friedman’s reasoning either, because
without some reasonably accurate approximation of the diagnostic
value of the evidence, the analysis suggested by Friedman cannot be
performed, and therefore helpfulness cannot be assessed and a real
risk of misleading the factfinder exists.
6
As emerges in Paul Giannelli’s paper, the absence of the type of
data needed to evaluate criminal case expert testimony seems to be
the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, given the lack of hard
data, forensic scientists—ironically, or perhaps understandably and
inevitably—seem to go out of their way to promote exaggerated
public and factfinder belief in their accuracy. The cases Giannelli
discusses suggest that these experts’ century long campaign of public
relations (at the neglect of empirical testing) has been quite
successful. All of that cuts against admissibility.
Consider for example expert testimony on bitemark
identification. For a quarter of a century many forensic dentists
assured judges and jurors of their competency and if they declared a
4

See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1047 (2003).
5
The study to which Friedman refers, Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle,
Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI.
964 (2002), disavows that its data support any possible conclusion about any error
rate. But plainly a reasonable argument can be made, and Friedman has made it,
that if we use mitochondrial DNA as the criterion of correctness, then an error rate
for microscopic hair identification can be estimated. As Friedman points out, that
error rate is that microscopic hair comparison “yields a positive result in nearly 35%
of the cases in which the facts are negative.”
6
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003).
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defendant’s dentition to match the crime scene bitemark, the
factfinder could be quite sure that the defendant is the person who
left the bite at the crime scene. These experts offered no systematic
data testing the accuracy of their claims, only vague assurances that
no two people on the planet had indistinguishably similar dentition,
assertions that bitemarks were much like fingerprints, and so on.
This fails the first criterion: the experts cannot supply data with which
to evaluate the likely accuracy of their opinions. The first and only
published research evaluating the accuracy of forensic dentists
revealed an average of 64% false positives and an average of 22%
7
false negatives.
With the advent and publication of such data, the factfinder has
its first opportunity to objectively assess the value of such witnesses’
identification opinions. But a court might still decide to exclude the
bitemark expert testimony because one study is insufficent, or
because the study is too global and not focused on the task-at-hand in
the case at bar. A court might also decide to exclude the bitemark
expert testimony (at least if it is offered to prove that a defendant is
the biter) because the false positive error rate is so high that whatever
little help it can offer is not worth the time and trouble to present it
(Fed. Rule of Evid. 403). The court might also consider the risk too
great that the factfinder will not properly discount the testimony, but
instead will give it excessive weight (Criterion 2). Because expert
witnesses might, once courts begin to insist on seeing data,
strategically design evaluation studies to make themselves look as
8
good as possible, courts might not find these studies dependable.
Therefore, a court might conclude that, despite the existence of the
“studies,” the factfinder still lacks adequate meaningful data
(Criterion 1) or the fact finder will be misled by the studies
(Criterion 2). Finally, if the court fears that the gap between the
public imagery of a field and its actual data are so great that the
factfinder is likely to have trouble adequately discounting the
7

C. Michael Bowers, Identification from Bitemarks: Proficiency Testing of Board
Certified Odontologists, 30-2.1.3[1], in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE]. Three similar studies by the forensic odontology
community were conducted but not published (because, I am told by Dr. Bowers,
those results were deemed unsuitable to be made public). More generally, see Iain
Pretty & David Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses—A Critical
Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85 (2001).
8
Which, apparently is what the FBI internal fingerprint proficiency studies had
done. The court in United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (2002) (LleraPlaza II) concluded: “On the record made before me, the FBI examiners got very
high grades, but the tests they took did not.”
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testimony, then the court should exclude the evidence (Criterion 2 as
well as Fed. Rules of Evid. 403 and 702). In making that assessment,
some courts might take into account the possibility that any decision
by the gatekeeper to admit expert testimony will seem to the jury to
be some kind of endorsement of the expert evidence—an inference
which is hard to avoid after Daubert.
In summary, suppose an expert witness addressing an empirical
question was allowed to offer the jury an opinion on the task-at-hand
in a case. And suppose that on direct or cross-examination the
witness was asked, “When people in your field offer opinions
regarding this task, how accurate are they?” And suppose the expert
could not give an informative answer to such a question based on
sound and adequate data—in other words, the expert’s best honest
answer would have to be, “I don’t really know.” Or suppose
circumstances were such that the factfinder could not evaluate the
evidence with reasonable discernment. Then the expert’s testimony
probably would not be helpful to the factfinder, and a court would
sensibly exclude it.
II. POST-DAUBERT CHALLENGES TO FINGERPRINT EXPERT TESTIMONY
By the two criteria I have noted, which capture the heart of the
expert evidence admissibility standards of Daubert and its progeny,
fingerprint identification expert testimony falls short. In both of his
Llera-Plaza opinions, Judge Pollak concluded that the field of
fingerprint identification has thus far failed to systematically test its
9
underlying assumptions and its claims of expertise. At the same
time, the field has cultivated a public image of flawlessness, comes to
court claiming (literally) a “methodological” error rate of zero and
subscribes to a prohibition on “qualified” (less than certain) opinions
on identification. There is also about zero chance that a factfinder
will be adequately informed about the error rate and therefore be
enabled to accurately assess the expert’s opinion. Consequently, one
would think, given Friedman’s concerns about overly high standards
for admissibility set by the Supreme Court and the revised Fed. Rule
of Evid. 702, that fingerprint expert evidence would have
encountered newly raised barriers to admission. But, according to a
10
website maintained by members of the fingerprint expert
community, of the thirty-nine cases in which fingerprint expert
testimony has been challenged, the number of cases in which the
9

Id. at 564 (“I concluded in the January 7 opinion that Daubert’s testing factor
was not met, and I have found no reason to depart from that conclusion.”).
10
See www.onin.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (on file with author).
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proffered testimony was excluded was, also, zero.
This might seem to be paradoxical, but it is easily explained. If
instead of counting the holdings we read the cases, (fewer than half
of these thirty-nine decisions have been published) what we discover
is that the number of cases in which the courts conscientiously
applied Daubert and Kumho Tire is also zero. In this section, I
summarize and explicate how these courts could survey the wasteland
of non-research on fingerprint identification through the lens of
Daubert-Kumho Tire and yet conclude that what they see is “the very
11
archetype of reliable expert testimony under those standards.”
12
Recent judicial opinions reacting to challenges to asserted
fingerprint identification expertise are united by their failure to
13
conduct any thoughtful analysis under Daubert and Kumho Tire. The
opinions all resort to one or another evasion so that they can arrive at
what their authors assumed before analysis to be the unavoidable
conclusion, namely, that asserted fingerprint identification expertise
satisfies the law’s admissibility requirements. Something other than
conscientious analysis is required to reach such results. The
following discussion summarizes those recent opinions and explicates
what that “something else” is.
A. Refusal to Conduct a Daubert Hearing
Some courts refused to hold a 104(a) hearing, or to provide a
similar occasion on which the proponent of the expert evidence
might be called upon to establish its admissibility, and through which
the district court could develop an adequate record to support its
14
decision concerning the challenged expert testimony. To be sure,
the standard for requiring a 104(a) hearing is unclear, and district
courts are permitted considerable discretion in making the
determination. But holding in limine hearings to resolve complex
evidence issues is common practice and under appropriate
circumstances the failure to do so has been held to be an abuse of
discretion. Because of the gatekeeping obligations of district courts,
the duty to hold a 104(a) hearing has sometimes been held to be
11

United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 260
F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
12
The challengers’ case is summarized in Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet
Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002).
13
Or other applicable test, as in Frye jurisdictions.
14
United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001); see also
United States v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. Jul. 31, 2001); United States v.
Nadurath, 2002 WL 1000929 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2002); United States v. AmbrizVasquez, 2002 WL 848000 (9th Cir. May 2, 2002).
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necessary even when the moving party has not requested it.
16
In United States v. Joseph, the court offers no reasons for not
holding a hearing; it simply did not hold one. Moreover, it
apparently saw so little to be decided that it disposed of the whole
Daubert challenge in an opinion of less than two pages.
In support of its motion in limine and request for a hearing, the
17
opponent in United States v. Reaux drew the court’s attention to two
18
publications, cited in the court’s opinion. Though the publications
plainly seem to be germane, the court said nothing about them
beyond citing them. The court did not comment on why the
publications were insufficient to trigger a 104(a) hearing to resolve
the relevant controversies described in those writings as applied to
the admissibility issue before the court.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Ambriz19
Vasquez that it was not error for the district court to refuse to hold a
Daubert hearing. The Court of Appeals offered no evaluation of the
propriety of that refusal, beyond suggesting that it would be onerous
“to conduct Daubert hearings whenever defendants object to
fingerprint evidence,” and that in a previous case it similarly held that
“a trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted
20
fingerprint evidence without performing a Daubert analysis.” The
court does not reveal whatever knowledge it has about asserted
fingerprint expertise that makes Daubert hearings unnecessary.
If there are genuine issues raised concerning the claims of
expertise made by or on behalf of fingerprint examiners (and such

15

See discussion and review of cases in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note
7, § 1-2.1.1 (2002).
16
United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001).
17
United States v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. Jul.31, 2001).
18
The first was an article, Michael Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s
Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1998)
(discussing the absence, in the seminal judicial opinions admitting forensic science,
including fingerprints, of any evidence or analysis of the sort that would benefit a
modern court required to analyze such asserted expertise under Daubert). The
second was a portion of a chapter by David Stoney (discussion by a fingerprint expert
of areas of scientific disagreement among scientists concerning the nature and
adequacy of fingerprint identification). The latter can be found in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, § 27-2.3.1 (2002).
19
2002 WL 848000 (9th Cir. May 2, 2002).
20
While the quoted statement would seem to be a complete failure to perform its
gatekeeping function under Daubert, it would appear not to have been so in the
earlier case, United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996). In Sherwood,
the Court of Appeals noted that the defense conceded almost all of the issues it
might have raised in the Daubert hearing, so there was no need to conduct a Daubert
hearing.
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issues do seem to exist), some sort of occasion for adequately
exploring those issues is required. The Ninth Circuit in AmbrizVasquez reasoned that to expect courts to hold Daubert hearings on
asserted fingerprint expertise, “assumes that courts cannot take
21
judicial notice of the general acceptance of fingerprinting analysis.”
At some point, after courts have adequately and convincingly
explored the issues under Daubert (which to date they have barely
begun to do), it ought to be possible for subsequent courts to take
judicial notice of those issues, facts, analyses, and conclusions. Even
then, however, pursuant to the requirement of Kumho Tire that courts
focus on the specific task-at-hand upon which the expert is proposing
to opine (rather than a vague global approach to the whole field of
claimed expertise), judicial notice similarly would have to be focused
on those issues which had been adequately considered and which are
relevant to the task-at-hand in the case at bar. The use of judicial notice
therefore seems to be premature.
22
In United States v. Nadurath, the court stated that the opponent
of admission had “not provided any information that would call into
question the reliability of fingerprint expert testimony.” The court
provided no elaboration, not even to say that the defendant made a
bare objection without support. If that is indeed what happened, that
might well justify the refusal to conduct a 104(a) hearing. Some
courts have held, however, that at least a preliminary assessment of
any proffered expert testimony is necessary for district courts to
23
discharge their expert evidence gatekeeping responsibilities.
If
nothing else, courts, such as Nadurath, need to explain in their
opinions what it is they have done to discharge their gatekeeping
obligations, so courts above, and the larger society, can evaluate the
adequacy of those efforts.
B. Reversal of the Burden of Persuasion
Elementary principles of law place the burden of proof on the
24
proponent of the admission of evidence.
Accordingly, Daubert
places the initial burden of production on the proponent of the
proffered expert witness and requires the proponent to prove by a
21

United States v. Ambriz-Vasquez, 2002 WL 848000 (9th Cir. May 2, 2002).
United States v. Nadurath, 2002 WL 1000929 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2002).
23
E.g., Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
24
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5053 (“Normally the proponent of the evidence will have the burden of
proving the facts upon which admissibility depends, though often the objector will
have the burden of producing evidence to show the existence of grounds for the
objection.”).
22
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preponderance of the evidence that the criteria for admission have
25
been met.
Some courts have shifted the burden of persuasion onto the
26
challenger. The Joseph court commented that “the defendant has
not provided any evidence that either of these techniques are no
27
longer generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.”
This might have been an abbreviated way of saying: the proponent
has met his burden and the opponent has offered nothing. But the
court had nothing to say about the proponent’s case. It recited no
basis beyond a vague conclusory assertion that fingerprint
identification techniques, whatever their details, had “proven to be a
28
reliable science over decades of use for judicial purposes.” So it is
not apparent that the proponent offered adequate (or any) support
on behalf of its proffer. Thus, the plainest reading of the opinion is
that the court expected the opponent to prove that asserted
fingerprint expertise did not meet the requirements of Daubert,
rather than requiring the proponent to prove that it did. That is an
erroneous application of the law.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, on the appeal of United States v.
29
Rogers appeared to say that the proponent’s expert asserted the
existence of “numerous studies” supporting the claims of fingerprint
experts (though none are cited in the opinion), while complaining
that the opponent failed to produce any studies disproving the claims
of the proffered fingerprint expertise. Thus, the proponent’s general
30
assertion that supportive studies existed was sufficient, while, on the
other hand, the opponent was faulted for providing “no evidence
31
While the
suggesting that fingerprint evidence is unreliable.”
opinion is not clear on where it placed the burden of proof, the two
pages the Fourth Circuit devoted to this matter seem to indicate that
the court took the proponent’s case as a given, which the opponent
was required to knock down. Again, this is not the correct law.
Another example of reversing the burden of proof is provided

25

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n.20 (“These matters should be established by a
preponderance of proof.”).
26
United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001).
27
Id. at 1.
28
Id.
29
United States v. Rogers, 2001 WL 1635494 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2001) (Table).
30
On the claim of uniqueness of fingerprints and, presumably, of fingerprint
fragments as well, since that is usually the real issue in these cases, though the
opinions rarely seem to address that.
31
Id. at 1.
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32

by the district court in United States v. Cruz-Rivera. After accepting
the general validity of fingerprint identification techniques, the judge
framed the remaining question to be resolved as: “can the defendant
establish that the Puerto Rico Police fingerprint identification
practices followed in this case are so deficient . . . that the testimony
33
must be excluded . . . .”
Though Judge Pollak, in Llera-Plaza II, found, as he had in Llera34
Plaza I, that the “testing factor [of Daubert] was not met” and that
what little testing had been done was poor, the court nevertheless
concluded that the error rate was sufficiently low to satisfy Daubert.
How can this be? If there has been virtually no testing, then the rate
of error cannot be known. The court found the error rate factor to
be met because the opponent of admission had failed to adduce
proof that the FBI had made mistakes in earlier cases:
It has been open to defense counsel to present examples of
erroneous identifications attributable to FBI examiners, and no
such examples have been forthcoming. I conclude, therefore, on
the basis of the limited information in the record as expanded,
that there is no evidence that the error rate of certified FBI
fingerprint examiners is unacceptably high.35

The Llera-Plaza II court’s theory of why a reversal of the burden is
desirable is essentially this: to postpone admission of fingerprint
identification expertise pending research showing what it can and
cannot do and at what level of accuracy “would be to make the best
36
the enemy of the good.”
32

2002 WL 662128 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2002).
Id.
34
Id. at 564. “I concluded in the January 7 opinion that Daubert’s testing factor
was not met, and I have found no reason to depart from that conclusion.”
35
Id. at 566. Query how difficult it is to prove an erroneous conviction, especially
before the advent of DNA typing.
36
The court’s more complete statement of its theory is the following:
Having re-reviewed the applicability of the Daubert factors through the
prism of Kumho Tire, I conclude that the one Daubert factor which is
both pertinent and unsatisfied is the first factor—“testing.” Kumho Tire,
as I have noted above, instructs district courts to “consider the specific
factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the
reliability of expert testimony.” 526 U.S. at 152. Scientific tests of
ACE-V—i.e., tests in the Daubert sense—would clearly aid in measuring
ACE-V’s reliability. But, as of today, no such tests are in hand. The
question, then, is whether, in the absence of such tests, a court should
conclude that the ACE-V fingerprint identification system, as practiced
by certified FBI fingerprint examiners, has too great a likelihood of
producing erroneous results to be admissible as evidence in a
courtroom setting. There are respected authorities who, it appears,
would render such a verdict.
33
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Can anything be said on behalf of the correct legal rule except
that it is the law and courts have a duty to apply it? One of the virtues
of the customary burden of proof is that it impels experts and
proponents to produce data illuminating a court about the proffered
evidence. If their evidence is admissible without such illumination,
why would experts and proponents work to produce research? Actual
data can only undermine the glowing judicial presumptions of such
expertise by showing (as the few studies which have been done have
shown) that the claims made on behalf of fingerprint identification
expertise were exaggerations. If the field of fingerprint identification
had not produced studies illuminating most (or any?) of its most
fundamental claims about its subject and itself in the century past—
because it was being admitted without the data—why will it do so in
the century to come?
C. Ignoring Kumho Tire’s Task-at-Hand Requirement
Under Kumho Tire, district judges are required to determine with
some precision what the task-at-hand is to which the expert’s
testimony is proposed to be relevant. The gatekeeping responsibility,
then, is to evaluate whether the proposed expertise is “reliable” with
respect to that task-at-hand. Thus, a court must determine what the
fingerprint comparison problem is (a clear and complete latent print
versus a tiny fragment versus a montage of numerous overlaid
smeared latents, etc.) and whether the data show that the expert is
likely to be able to perform that particular type of examination
accurately. Under the law, a court is not to ask about a field in a
general and global way. Yet none of the courts considering
challenges to asserted fingerprint identification expertise gives any
indication that they appreciated and applied the task-at-hand
As explained in Part II of this opinion, I have found, on the record
before me, that there is no evidence that certified FBI fingerprint
examiners present erroneous identification testimony, and, as a
corollary, that there is no evidence that the rate of error of certified
FBI fingerprint examiners is unacceptably high. With those findings in
mind, I am not persuaded that courts should defer admission of
testimony with respect to fingerprinting—which Professors Neufeld
and Scheck term “[t]he bedrock forensic identifier of the 20th
century”—until academic investigators financed by the National
Institute of Justice have made substantial headway on a “verification
and validation” research agenda. For the National Institute of Justice,
or other institutions both public and private, to sponsor such research
would be all to the good. But to postpone present in-court utilization
of this “bedrock forensic identifier” pending such research would be to
make the best the enemy of the good.
Id. at 571-72.

2003

EVALUATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE

1177

requirement.
D. Avoidance of Actual Daubert Analysis
In this section, I disregard appellate opinions that were casual
about their Daubert analysis if they also concluded that even if the
fingerprint expert testimony was admitted in error, it was harmless
37
error given the other evidence.
Where the expert testimony is
irrelevant to the outcome of the case, there is no purpose in
performing a careful Daubert analysis on appeal. The better course,
however, is not to perform a sloppy Daubert analysis and then to say
“but even if it was error it was harmless error.” The better course
38
would be to decline to reach unnecessary issues. That is to say, if a
task (here, a Daubert analysis) is worth doing, it is worth doing right.
In any event, in this subsection I am concerned primarily with cases
in which a serious Daubert analysis was necessary, but was performed
poorly or not at all.
39
The court in Joseph noted that it is first required to determine
“whether the Government’s fingerprint evidence is scientific
40
knowledge.
And, second, the court is required to determine
“whether the [expert] evidence will ‘assist the trier of fact to
41
understand or determine a fact in issue.’” The court answered both
questions in the affirmative. These naked conclusions are just about
all the court had to say on these subjects. Though the court began its
opinion by reciting the Daubert “factors,” those factors are not
employed to analyze the admissibility of the challenged fingerprint
identification expertise. Indeed, the court never mentioned the
factors again. Apparently, the precise issue raised by the opponent of
the expert testimony was whether the method used by the proffered
expert was an acceptable method (in contrast to an alternative
method). To this the court stated, “fingerprint analysis has been
tested and proven to be a reliable science over decades of use for
judicial purposes; and fingerprint technicians utilizing both the
Galton and ridgeology techniques follow established principles and
42
use scientific methods that are recognized in their particular field.”
This is a statement of faith, not legal or scientific analysis.

37

United States v. Rogers, 2001 WL 1635494 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2001) (Table);
United States v. Turner, 2002 WL 491887 (10th Cir. Apr. 2, 2002).
38
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Garduno, 2002 WL 464532 (9th Cir. 2002).
39
United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001).
40
Id. at *1.
41
Id. at *2.
42
Id. at *1.
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43

The Reaux court went to some trouble to discuss the holdings
of Daubert and Kumho Tire and numerous cases following in the wake
of those opinions. Without explicitly saying what principles were
being applied from those cases, the court’s admissibility analysis had
two elements. First, it discussed the qualifications of the proffered
expert. Although the expert’s qualifications are important for some
purposes, they are irrelevant to answering the question of whether an
44
expertise exists, which is the focus of Daubert. Second, the court
45
explicitly adopted the analysis of United States v. Havvard, an
46
exceedingly weak opinion.
At trial, the Havvard court misunderstood much of what the
Supreme Court had been saying in its expert evidence admissibility
rulings, and offered trial process answers to most of the scientific
47
questions posed by Daubert. The district court was unable to cite a
single published study, or find any kind of a systematic empirical
answer to any of the questions posed about the claims of fingerprint
experts. In addition the court had to invent excuses for gaps left
48
unfilled by the fingerprint field. Nonetheless the court concluded
that fingerprint examiners passed Daubert and Kumho Tire with flying
colors, stating that the testimony was “the very archetype of reliable
49
expert testimony under those standards.”

43

United States v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. Jul.31, 2001).
By analogy: It does not matter how well trained, how experienced, or how
distinguished an astrologer is if astrology lacks validity.
45
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir.2001).
46
See detailed reviews of Havvard in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, §
27-1.2 (2002); Comment, Evidence—Fingerprint Experts—Seventh Circuit Upholds the
Reliability of Expert Testimony Regarding the Source of a Latent Fingerprint—United States
v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), 115. HARV. L. REV. 2349 (2002). See also
comments on Havvard in United States v. Llera-Plaza, 2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa.) [LleraPlaza I].
47
For example, see Llera-Plaza I (commenting on Havvard: “‘‘[A]dversarial’
testing in court is not . . . what the Supreme Court meant when it discussed testing as
an admissibility factor”). 2002 WL 27305, at *10.
48
”In Havvard, the court stated that the publication factor ‘does not fit well with
fingerprint identification because it is a field that has developed primarily for
forensic purposes.’ While it is correct that the end purpose of fingerprint
identifications is a forensic one, the reliability of identification techniques must be
assessed just as any other scientific, technical, or specialized technique under Rule
702.” Llera-Plaza I, 2002 WL 27305, at *12, n. 19 (E.D. Pa.).
49
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 855, aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
44
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E. Turning Kumho Tire on its Head
50

On the appeal of Havvard, the Seventh Circuit not only
endorsed all of the district court’s curious misunderstandings of
Daubert, it invented its own curious misunderstanding of Kumho Tire.
In Kumho Tire, a unanimous Supreme Court held that all fields, not
only “scientific” fields, had to satisfy the fundamental reliability
51
standards of Daubert. In responding to the appellant’s argument
that fingerprint evidence lacks a sufficient scientific basis, the Seventh
Circuit countered by arguing:
The standards of Daubert . . . are not limited in application to
‘scientific’ testimony alone. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S. Ct.
1167 (holding that ‘the basic gatekeeping obligation’ of Daubert
applies to all expert testimony). Therefore, the idea that
fingerprint comparison is not sufficiently ‘scientific’ cannot be
52
the basis for exclusion under Daubert.

The Seventh Circuit’s statement is irresolvably incoherent. By
expanding Daubert’s essential application to all fields, not only
scientific fields, the Supreme Court closed a major hole through
which some fields were trying to escape Daubert’s scrutiny. Kumho Tire
did not create new escape hatches, it closed old ones. A field
amenable to evaluation by scientific criteria can readily be evaluated
by the “Daubert factors.” That is what the field of fingerprint
examination is: an empirical field. That is what its practitioners claim
to be: forensic scientists, people who work with observable, empirical
things. And that is what the Havvard trial court’s analysis purports to
find: that it is scientific, and that it passes Daubert’s scientific criteria
with flying colors. An attack on fingerprint identification claiming
that its scientific basis is inadequate (e.g., insufficient testing) is
directly on point.
The Court of Appeals sought to remove
fingerprinting from the realm of the empirical, in order to move it
50

Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 848, aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). The
Seventh Circuit states that it reviewed Havvard de novo. United States v. Havvard, 260
F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2001). Rulings on admissibility are to be reviewed
deferentially. General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Rulings on or
applications of law are to be reviewed de novo. The Seventh Circuit does not explain
what it is reviewing deferentially and what it is reviewing de novo, nor can those be
discerned from the rest of the opinion.
51
See MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, § 1-3.5 (2002).
52
See also United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1295 (D. Kan. Feb. 21,
2002), asserting that Kumho Tire reduced, rather than reinforced, the obligation of
judges to evaluate proffered expert testimony in a highly rigorous way: “The
Supreme Court itself eschewed such a reading when it dismissed the argument that
the trial court’s gatekeeping obligation depended on whether the expert knowledge
to be offered was scientific, technical or other . . . .”
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out of Daubert’s reach. Bizarrely, it relied on Kumho Tire to
accomplish that, even though Kumho Tire stands for exactly the
opposite proposition, namely, that there is to be no escape from
appropriate scrutiny.
F. Reliance on Admission by Other Courts
Some courts made much of the fact that fingerprint expert
evidence had been admitted in American courts for most of the
twentieth century. Of what value is this fact in the evaluation of an
asserted expertise under Daubert?
The Fourth Circuit, in reviewing Rogers, stated that, “virtually
every circuit and district court, both before and after Daubert, have a
longstanding tradition of allowing fingerprint examiners to state
53
their opinion and conclusions” The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing
Havvard, commented that, “The district court recognized that
establishing the reliability of fingerprint analysis was made easier by
54
its 100 years of successful use in criminal trials . . . .”
Neither
appellate court says a word about how a long history of admission
advances an admissibility analysis under Daubert. The mere existence
of a long history of judicial admission does not in itself contribute
anything to analysis under Daubert. The Supreme Court in Daubert
observed, “Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to
be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily
defended.” The point is not that a scientific claim gains validity by
being let into courtrooms over a long period, but rather that
propositions which have had time to be tested and found to have
sound bases will for that reason be “less likely to be challenged . . . and .
. . more handily defended.” The Fourth and Seventh Circuits failed
to say what it is that was learned during that century of admission that
lent support to the claims asserted by fingerprint experts.
Ironically, some forensic scientists and their proponents have
sought to explain their fields’ shortcomings by arguing that their
long history of admission retarded any tendency these fields might
otherwise have had to seriously test their claims in a manner that
55
would meet the requirements of Daubert and Kumho Tire.

53

United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171, 2001 WL 1635494 (4th Cir. Dec.
20, 2001) (Table).
54
United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2001).
55
J. Orenstein, Effect of the Daubert Decision on Document Examinations from the
Prosecutor’s Perspective, in 1 FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNICATIONS (Oct. 1999), at
http://www.fbi.gov/programs/lab/fsc/backissu/oct1999/abstrcte.htm.
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G. Reliance on General Acceptance
A century of admission under older rules might have no
relevance to an analysis that must be conducted pursuant to a new
and different rule (i.e., Daubert). In the present context, however, it
is possible that pre-Daubert admissions decisions are relevant to the
general acceptance “factor,” which remains a consideration under
Daubert. Several courts relied on general acceptance to admit
56
fingerprint experts. One might argue (though none of these courts
did) that a century of admission impliedly informs a post-Daubert
court that pre-Daubert courts were finding general acceptance,
because Frye was the dominant test before Daubert. The flaw in this
reasoning would be that all of the major seminal fingerprint
admission cases were decided before the general acceptance test was
invented. As early as 1918, courts were admitting fingerprints merely
by citing opinions from sister jurisdictions which had already
admitted fingerprints.
Yet those sister jurisdictions were not
57
employing Frye (or any other articulable test).
What today’s courts might be trying to say is that there has been
judicial general acceptance for the better part of a century (among
pre-Daubert courts), and so there should continue to be judicial
58
acceptance (among post-Daubert courts). This, of course, has never
been a recognized test of admissibility, and certainly is not a criterion
for admission under Daubert or Kumho Tire.
The proponents of admission often claim, as they did in LleraPlaza I, that, “[t]he ACE-V process has been tested empirically [in
courtrooms] over a period of 100 years and in any particular case
they can be tested by examination of the evidence by another
59
expert.” On the latter point, the court noted that examination by
another expert is simply not the kind of testing that is capable of
60
confirming or refuting the theory or the technique. On the former
56

United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001); see also
United States v. Salim, 2002 WL 372911 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2002); United States v.
Ambriz-Vasquez, 2002 WL 848000 (9th Cir. May 2, 2002).
57
See MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, § 27-1.1 (2002).
58
For example, one court states: “Used successfully in criminal trials for over 100
years, fingerprint identification analysis has withstood the scrutiny and testing of the
adversarial process.” United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (D. Kan. Feb.
21, 2002).
59
Llera-Plaza I, 2002 WL 27305 at *9.
60
Said the court:
[I]t is not apparent that a result arrived at by a second examiner
discrepant from a result arrived at by a prior examiner would (1)
establish that the first result was erroneous, or (2) offer a secure basis
for concluding that the “technique” was faulty. A scientist might be
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point, the court noted that, “‘[A]dversarial’ testing in court is not,
however, what the Supreme Court meant when it discussed testing as
61
an admissibility factor.”
Moreover, while there were “numerous
writings that discuss the fingerprint identification techniques
employed by fingerprint examiners,” none of them tested the
technique’s dependability.
But the consensus of this narrow community is not sufficient for
two essential reasons, as the court in Llera-Plaza I explained:
General acceptance by the fingerprint examiner community does
not, however, meet the standard set by Rule 702. First, there is
the difficulty that fingerprint examiners, while respected
professionals, do not constitute a “scientific community” in the
Daubert sense. Second, the Court cautioned in Kumho Tire that
general acceptance does not “help show that an expert’s
testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability.”
The failure of fingerprint identifications fully to satisfy the first
three Daubert factors militates against heavy reliance on the
general acceptance factor. Thus, while fingerprint examinations
conducted under the general ACE-V rubric are generally
accepted as reliable by fingerprint examiners, this by itself cannot
sustain the government’s burden in making the case for the
admissibility of fingerprint testimony under Federal Rule of
62
Evidence 702 [citations omitted].

Under Daubert, general acceptance must be evaluated in
conjunction with other factors. In fields which have been found to
have a vigorous tradition of testing, that which becomes generally
accepted carries more weight than in fields without such a tradition.
Where inquiry into other factors (such as testing, methodological
quality of published peer reviewed research, and error rates) does
not support admission, general acceptance does not become the one
last hook on which an admission decision can be hung. As the
Supreme Court stated in Kumho Tire, general acceptance does not
“help show that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline
63
itself lacks reliability.” In short, general acceptance cannot properly
secure admission of asserted fingerprint expertise when the other
criteria have failed to do so.

disposed to require scores, or perhaps hundreds, of observations
before regarding the “technique” as having been “tested.”
Id. at *10.
61
Id. at *11.
62
Id. at *18.
63
Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,151 (1999).
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H. Emphasis on Flexibility of Criteria
Where application of the basic “Daubert factors” is not providing
support for admission, some courts have turned to language in both
Daubert and Kumho Tire which authorizes flexibility in the selection of
criteria for evaluating proffered experts. The Fourth Circuit in Rogers
stated: “the Daubert Court also emphasized that this inquiry should be
64
flexible.”
The Reaux court stated, “in Kumho Tire, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and that
Daubert’s list of specific factors does not necessarily, nor exclusively,
65
apply to all experts in every case.”
These references to “flexibility” should have been followed by an
explanation of what evaluation criteria the court thought were more
appropriate than those in Daubert, why they were more appropriate,
and then a thoughtful application of those more appropriate factors.
Instead, these two courts used the “flexibility” language as a license to
select vague criteria and apply them loosely and without explanation.
Three concurring Justices in Kumho Tire anticipated such evasions,
and suggested that they were likely to constitute an abuse of
66
discretion.
67
The district court in Cline ignored Daubert and Kumho Tire.
First, Cline declared that “evidentiary Daubert hearings were
unnecessary as the reliability of the methods [of fingerprint
68
examiners] could be properly taken for granted.”
In criticizing
decisions which had followed Daubert more faithfully, the court added
it seems an unreasonable stretch simply to discard this
[unsystematic, unscientific] experiential testing [by fingerprint
examiners] as wholly unreliable and to relegate the testifying
opinions of all these fingerprint examiners to ipse dixit. Moreover,
this court joins others who do not read Daubert and Kumho as
elevating the scientific method to the touchstone by which all

64

United States v. Rogers, 2001 WL 1635494 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2001) (Table).
(citations omitted).
65
United States v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. July 31, 2001).
66
“I join the opinion of the Court, which makes clear that the discretion it
endorses—trial-court discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert
reliability—is not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function. I think it worth
adding that it is not discretion to perform the function inadequately. Rather, it is
discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse
and science that is junky. Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubert
factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of
them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S.
at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring).
67
United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. Feb. 21, 2002).
68
Id. at 1294.
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69

Although there is no one who has “read Daubert and Kumho as
elevating the scientific method to the touchstone by which all Rule
702 evidence is to be judged,” the Supreme Court’s opinions in
Daubert and Kumho Tire were rather clear on what is, at bottom,
required. First, a conscientious determination of the soundness of
proffered expertise as a condition for its admission. Second, that
appropriate criteria must be utilized in making that evaluation.
Where scientific criteria are appropriate the Daubert factors should be
conscientiously employed. Where other criteria would be better and
70
more appropriate, the court should conscientiously employ them.
In the field of asserted fingerprint identification expertise, there
is no reason not to apply the basic Daubert factors. This field deals
with empirical phenomena and makes entirely empirical claims. The
basic scientific criteria embodied in the Daubert “factors” are entirely
71
appropriate for its evaluation. Moreover, no one claims that the
fingerprint field cannot perform empirical tests, only that it has not
done so for the greater part of the past century. Indeed, this field has
begun to do so only very recently and only because of the threat of
72
limitation or exclusion under Daubert.
I. Bringing the Standards Down to Meet the Expertise
73

The Cline court implicitly found that asserted fingerprint
expertise is not scientific, has not been well tested, is in need of
“traditional” scientific testing, lacks an adequate body of peer
69

Id. at 1295.
That is the gravamen of Kumho Tire. See MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra
note 7, §§ 1-3.5 and 2.0 (2002).
71
As the court notes in Llera-Plaza I, “[i]n their submissions in the case at bar,
both the government and the defendants have undertaken to apply the Daubert
factors, albeit with discrepant results.” 2002 WL 27305 at *9. The court agreed “with
the parties that, with respect to fingerprint identification evidence, the Daubert
factors constitute a proper touchstone of admissibility . . . .” Id.
72
Forensic scientists and police agencies knew that Daubert presented a serious
challenge that they were not prepared to meet. They submitted an amicus brief in
Kumho Tire urging that Daubert’s scrutiny not be extended to fields that had failed to
test their propositions systematically. Brief Amici Curiae of Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement, Inc. et al., Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999). Though the Supreme Court unanimously rejected such arguments, these
fields did not anticipate the extent to which lower court judges would find ways to
keep admitting them, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s opinions to the
contrary. Also, several fields of forensic science, including fingerprint identification,
abruptly became interested in seeing federal funds spent on research to prove the
validity of their claims. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FORENSIC FRICTION RIDGE
(FINGERPRINT) EXAMINATION VALIDATION STUDIES (Mar. 2000).
73
United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. Feb. 21, 2002).
70
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reviewed literature, and lacks uniform standards. Had the court
reached the opposite conclusion in each of these statements, about
the fingerprint field’s state of knowledge, we can safely assume that
the court would have declared that fingerprint expertise passed
muster under Daubert. But, having found these deficiencies the court
did not conclude that the expertise at issue fails Daubert, and
therefore testimony based on it must be excluded or have limitations
placed upon it. Instead, the court concluded that these shortcomings
meant that alternative, less rigorous, criteria needed to be employed
in order to facilitate admission. This kind of back door to admission
is what Kumho Tire was designed to eliminate, and in many instances
74
has eliminated.
75
Similarly, although somewhat less explicitly, in Llera-Plaza II
Judge Pollak reasoned as though Kumho Tire had never been decided.
That is, he refrained from subjecting the proffered expertise to the
most appropriate evaluation criteria. Because the court found that
fingerprint examination is not a science it determined less need be
asked of it in the way of empirical verification. Judge Pollak initially
commented that fingerprinting “is not, in my judgment, itself a
science.” The court seemed to think that this judgment affected the
admissibility analysis. “In adjusting the focus of inquiry from
[fingerprinting’s] status as a ‘scientific’ discipline to its status as a
‘technical’ discipline, one modifies the angle of doctrinal vision.”
The court, thus, disregarded the mandate of Kumho Tire by finding
that fingerprint identification could avoid the rigors of Daubert by
dubbing its practitioners “specialists” rather than “scientists.” This
seems to be exactly the back door into court that in Kumho Tire the
76
Supreme Court had closed and locked.
The court’s view that fingerprinting was something other than a
science changed the court’s analyses of the peer review and general

74

Compare United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding, before Kumho Tire, that because forensic document examination failed to
meet Daubert it was not science; because it was not science it need not meet the
requirements of Daubert; and therefore it was admissible under a much lower and
unspecified standard), with United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)
(holding, after Kumho Tire, that because forensic document examination failed to
meet Daubert, its opinions on identity were inadmissible).
75
United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (2002).
76
What Kumho Tire instructs is that all fields, regardless of their labels, be
subjected to sound evaluation criteria. Fields are not to be excused from rigorous
scrutiny for the very reason that they have not taken the trouble to subject themselves
to rigorous testing. A field of endeavor need not “be a science” in order to be
evaluated using scientific methods, which, after all, is essentially the use of rigorous
logic to evaluate empirical claims.
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acceptance criteria of Daubert. In his earlier decision, Judge Pollak
was unimpressed with the fact that fingerprinting had been generally
accepted by a self-interested guild. In Llera-Plaza II this uncritical
consensus impressed him:
I conclude that the fingerprint community’s “general acceptance”
of ACE-V should not be discounted because fingerprint
specialists—like accountants, vocational experts, accidentreconstruction experts, appraisers of land or of art, experts in tire
failure analysis, or others—have “technical, or other specialized
knowledge” (Rule 702), rather that “scientific . . . knowledge” and
hence are not members of what Daubert termed a “scientific
community.”77

J. Relegate to Weight, Not Admissibility
78

Further, the Cline court argued that the central dispute about
fingerprint expert evidence is whether examiners are justified in
testifying to extreme assertions of absolute, certain, pinpoint,
identification to the exclusion of all others in the world, even when
dealing with smeared fragments of latent prints. The court opined
79
that such a debate should be left to the jury to resolve.
CONCLUSION
Shortly after the decision in Daubert, I mused that the law’s
adoption of a more scientific approach to evaluating the helpfulness
of expert testimony presaged a collision between the irresistible force
80
of Daubert and the immovable object of fingerprint expert testimony.
The cases described above constitute the (current) outcome of that
collision. One could say that both Daubert and fingerprint expert
testimony emerged from the collision intact. Daubert did not have to
be changed, it needed only to be ignored. As a result, the knowledge
base of fingerprint expert testimony has not needed to be augmented
81
nor has the testimony itself needed to be changed.
Ironically, the failure of judges to write a coherent defense of
asserted fingerprint expertise under Daubert, but only to seek ways to
77

Llera-Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2002).
79
This is the oldest device in the judicial toolbox for avoiding having to make
admissibility decisions. It is surprising that is does not appear more often in today’s
cases.
80
Michael J. Saks, The Implications of Daubert for Forensic Identification Science, in 1
SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q. 427 (1994).
81
Such as by tempering it with the limitations of the data, the theory, or the
boundary conditions made relevant by the task at hand.
78

2003

EVALUATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE

1187

shelter it from serious scrutiny, suggests that fingerprint expert
evidence actually does not meet the requirements of Daubert.
If the claims and assumptions of fingerprint identification
expertise had been empirically tested, if these empirical tests were
82
sufficiently well designed so as to survive peer review leading to
publication in scientifically respectable journals and had survived the
more important debate in the intellectual marketplace following
publication, and the data convincingly showed low error rates for the
83
relevant task-at-hand, and if these findings had come to be generally
accepted among relevant scientific and professional communities
beyond the circle of police technicians who practice the art—then
the proponents no doubt would have eagerly offered such
information to the courts and the judges would have had ample
material with which to write cogent opinions. That such material was
not cited in any of the opinions suggests that it does not exist. If the
grounds for admitting fingerprint examiners’ testimony were as
sound and as solid as the judges assert that it is, then it should not be
so difficult to write an opinion actually presenting those grounds.
Because conventional support for the admission of an asserted
expertise about an empirical phenomenon do not exist for
fingerprint identification, the courts have been casting about in
search of persuasive justification for admission on some other basis,
thus far without success.

82

A careful reading of the relevant portion of Daubert, as well as an
understanding of the intellectual nature of science, suggests this to be the gravamen
of the “peer review and publication” element. 509 U.S. at 593.
83
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (“the trial judge” has the obligation “of ensuring
that,” among other things, “an expert’s testimony” is “relevant to the task at hand”);
see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 137 (which is informed from its outset and throughout
by the task at hand notion).

